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The philosophical debate about the ethics of immigration is often conducted
within the parameters of ideal theory. One focal question in this debate is
whether states are morally justified in restricting immigration, and this question
is typically addressed under the idealized assumption of a fully just world in
which there are no limits to the feasibility of ideally just policies and no issues of
non-compliance.
Would an ideal world be a world of open borders, where each individual
enjoyed international freedom of movement (Carens 1987, 2013, ch. 11; Oberman
2016)? Would it be a world consisting of distinct national communities, each with
a right to control immigration in order to protect and shape their national culture
(Kymlicka 2001; Miller 2005, 2016)? Or would states ideally look like clubs, which
have a right to reject potential newcomers irrespective of whether or not current
members share a sense of national belonging (Wellman 2008, 2011)?
These questions are of course important in their own right. But whatever our
responses to them are, they may end up giving us relatively little guidance in
addressing some of the most pressing ethical issues regarding immigration in
the real world. In an ideal world, there would be no refugees, let alone states
that do not do their fair share in accommodating them. There would be no racist
political movements. Political agents would never be forced to choose a lesser
evil. Presumably, nobody would risk their lives in order to get to Europe or North
America, and there would be no irregular migrants (though we might disagree
whether this is because restrictions on immigration would be respected or
because they would not exist in the first place).
In other words, there is a considerable gap between the questions addressed
by the ideal part of the ethics of immigration and the issues that arise in the non-
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ideal world we actually inhabit. This special issue takes up the challenge of
bridging this gap and explores some of the ways in which the non-ideal
conditions of the real world should inform our judgements about justice in the
realm of immigration.
Non-ideal circumstances come in different varieties, and there is a debate
about how best to categorize them in general (Simmons 2010; Valentini 2012).
For the applied context we are concerned with here, we may distinguish
between two general types of issues: problems of non-compliance and problems
of feasibility.
Problems of non-compliance are at the core of John Rawls’ original use of
the term ‘nonideal theory’ (Rawls 1971, pp. 8f., 245f.) They arise when some
(individual or collective) agents do not comply with the demands of justice.
Such situations raise a number of difficult moral questions. First, there is the
issue of a purported duty to ‘take up the slack’ if others fail to do their part in a
morally required collective endeavour (Murphy 2000; Miller 2013; Karnein 2014).
Whether there is such a duty matters in the ethics of immigration, for instance
with regard to states’ obligations towards refugees: Does an individual state
have a duty to admit more refugees if other states fail to take in their ‘fair share’
(Kuosmanen 2012; Miller 2016, chs. 5, 9)?
A second important problem regarding non-compliance concerns the treat-
ment of defectors themselves. Irregular immigrants may be seen as a case of
application, at least if the legal restrictions on immigration they violate are
assumed to be justifiable. Under this assumption, irregular migrants commit a
straightforward wrong by entering or staying in a territory without permission,
and the question is whether and how their non-compliance should be sanc-
tioned, and whether there might be a case for legalizing their stay in the long
run despite the wrong they committed (Carens 2013, ch. 7).
However, it is debatable whether the breach of existing restrictions on
immigration is really a straightforward moral wrong, for the relevant laws may
themselves be unjust. Under such circumstances, the most salient form of non-
compliance would be the state’s failure to comply with the demands of justice.
In this case, a third issue arises: the question of whether there is a duty to obey
unjust legal rules. While the bindingness of unjust laws has been discussed
prominently especially with reference to civil disobedience (Rawls 1971, §§ 53,
55, 57), it has not yet been debated comprehensively in the context of immigra-
tion (for an exception, see Hidalgo 2015).
Fourth, non-compliance may enter the moral picture as background injus-
tice. That is, wrongs from outside the realm of immigration policy, committed
either by the country of destination or a third party, may impact the way states
ought to deal with would-be immigrants. For instance, if states have a moral
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right to exclude in ideal theory, does this right hold vis-à-vis immigrants from
former colonies (Amighetti and Nuti 2016)? What are our duties of admission
towards those whose human rights are not protected effectively by their coun-
tries of origin? Should they all be recognized as refugees (Shacknove 1985), or
should we hold on to a conception that considers persecution a necessary
condition of refugeehood (Price 2009; Cherem 2016)?
A second general set of problems in non-ideal theory arises from the fact
that not everything we may wish for in the domain of immigration policy will
turn out to be (politically) feasible. This triggers the question of whether and
how feasibility constraints should influence our theorizing about the ethics of
immigration (Carens 1996).
There are at least three distinct issues to consider here. First, one might think
that some demands should be disqualified entirely as demands of justice because
their realization is entirely infeasible. This is of course a prominent charge against
open borders positions in the public debate. Second, even if a demand stands as a
genuine demand of justice in ideal theory, it may not be directly applicable to an
individual agent under non-ideal circumstances. For instance, if a right to
international freedom of movement is justified in ideal theory, does this imply
that an individual politician is under a duty to lobby for the recognition of this
right, even if she has no chance of succeeding and will likely lose her seat in
parliament if she tries? If not, what exactly are the practical implications of a
moral right to international freedom of movement? Third, a proposal that is feasible
individuallymay not be feasible jointly with other justified demands, and this raises
difficult questions about how to prioritize different claims of justice. For example,
some authors have argued that substantial immigration will undermine social trust
among citizens and thus make a strong welfare state infeasible (Miller 2016, pp. 9–
11, 64f.). Does this make for a convincing case for restricting international freedom
of movement?
This last example also illustrates an important caveat about our mapping of
different kinds of non-idealness: What is considered a feasibility constraint by
some may be seen as an instance of non-compliance by others. For instance,
Ryan Pevnick has argued that, if citizens are indeed unwilling to uphold
redistributive programmes in the face of increasing cultural heterogeneity, this
may be a case of objectionable ‘threat-mongering’ (Pevnick 2011, p. 160) rather
than a hard fact that should enter our normative thinking as an exogenous
variable. On his view, individual reactions to immigration should themselves be
subject to moral evaluation. David Miller, by contrast, stresses that
‘simply telling people that they should be less prejudiced and more trusting of
strangers’ is not an option if we are to adopt a ‘political approach’ to immigra-
tion (Miller 2016, p. 18).
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This is but one example for the more general fact that there is not only a
wide range of competing views about substantial questions on justice in
immigration, but also considerable disagreement about basic questions of meth-
odology. This fact is reflected by the variety of both methodological approaches
and substantial positions in this special issue.
David Owen addresses the pertinent problem of non-compliance in refugee
protection. He considers whether states have a duty to accommodate more than
their ‘fair share’ of international refugees if other states fail to do their part in
protecting the persecuted. As he notes, duties towards refugees are always
duties to ‘take up the slack’ in some sense: If all states complied with their
duty to protect their own citizens’ human rights, there would be no refugees.
Nevertheless, Owen argues, duties towards refugees are genuine duties of jus-
tice. They oblige states to effectively remedy an injustice. If effective remedy
cannot be realized via a fair scheme of burden sharing, justice demands that a
state does more than it would ideally have to.
Javier Hidalgo’s contribution is also concerned with non-compliance, though
he focuses on the duties of individuals in the face of unjust laws. He considers
the obligations of citizens in cases where a state unjustly restricts immigration
and some immigrants, in turn, do not comply with these unjust laws and reside
in the country illegally. Hidalgo argues that, in such a situation, individual
citizens have a moral duty to disobey legal rules that prohibit them from
interacting with irregular immigrants.
Linda Bosniak addresses irregular migration as well, but focuses on institu-
tions rather than individual conduct, and starts from different normative pre-
mises. Granting that states may restrict immigration in general, she offers a
typology of arguments in favour of regularization. ‘Supersession arguments’,
which claim that the initial wrong of unauthorized immigration is outweighed
by a change in circumstances, are still the most common according to Bosniak.
However, they are not necessarily the most promising, let alone the only way to
argue for regularization. The alternatives she considers include ‘contempo-
raneous override arguments’ that turn on an excuse or justification for unauthor-
ized immigration, and ‘corrective override arguments’ that point to background
injustices in the relation between sending and receiving countries.
While the first three articles in this special issue focus on problems of non-
compliance, Julian Müller’s contribution shifts the attention to questions of
feasibility. He identifies four feasibility constraints that normative proposals have
to pass in order to be attractive from the perspective of non-ideal theory. He then
uses these constraints to compare the lifting of immigration restrictions to other
potential measures to address global poverty. While liberalizing immigration may
be more feasible than the establishment of redistributive programmes on a global
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level, he argues that an open borders policy still fails to meet the relevant feasibility
tests. He proposes the establishment of charter cities as a solution that better aligns
the demands of morality with considerations of feasibility.
In his partial defence of Michael Blake’s (2013) ‘jurisdictional theory of immi-
gration’, Henning Hahn also draws on considerations of feasibility. According to
Blake, states may exclude would-be immigrants because current citizens have a
right not to be burdenedwith new human rights obligations against their will. Hahn
defends this theory against cosmopolitan critics by drawing on a political concep-
tion of human rights that takes issues of feasibility seriously. At the same time, he
argues that this understanding of human rights implies limitations to the right to
exclude that Blake himself does not accept. In Hahn’s view, states have a duty to
issue hospitable visa regulations and are required to admit not only the politically
persecuted but also those who migrate due to other human rights violations,
including the violation of socio-economic rights.
Oliviero Angeli’s contribution addresses a topic that is often overlooked in
the debate about the ethics of migration: the right not to migrate. Angeli argues
that, while there is a strong interest in international freedom of movement, there
is an even stronger interest in not having to leave one’s country of residence
against one’s will. The right to stay, in his view, is not only violated by expulsion
and deportation, but also by ‘emigration pressures’, which he describes as a
form of structural injustice. In cases of conflict, the right to stay is more resistant
to trade-offs than the right to international freedom of movement, and states
may levy a special entry fee on well-off immigrants in order to better protect
current residents against emigration pressures.
Last but not least, Zoltan Miklosi considers another potential clash between
different justified normative demands. Cosmopolitans typically accept a pre-
sumption in favour of open borders. At the same time, they are committed to
encompassing cosmopolitan reforms in the long run. Thomas Christiano (2008)
has argued that cosmopolitans may have to accept restrictions on immigration
in the short run, because the feasibility of a cosmopolitan order hinges on the
existence of well-functioning democratic states in a transitional period, which
might be endangered by large-scale immigration. Miklosi challenges both the
empirical and the normative premises of this argument, and argues that it is all
but clear that the claims of poor admission-seekers in the present are out-
weighed by the claims of the worst-off in the distant future.
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